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FEBRUARY 1970	 NUMBER 2
THE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT REGULATIONS:
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS AND OPERATIONAL
ASPECTS EXAMINED
JOHN R. GARSON *
JEFFREY G. MILLER**
PART ONE: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY AND PROPRIETY
OF EXECUTIVE EMERGENCY POWERS
On January 1, 1968, President Johnson signed Executive Order
11387, "Governing Certain Transfers Abroad."' The Department of
Commerce implemented the Executive Order the same day with the
issuance of the Foreign Direct Investment Regulations (FDIR).2 The
Executive Order and the FDIR restrict the amounts of capital that
American investors may transfer to or accumulate in foreign affiliates,'
and compel repatriation of short-term liquid balances such as foreign
bank deposits.' The Executive Order and the FDIR are based on the
President's authority under Section 5(b) of the Trading with the
Enemy Act of 1917, as amended.' Section 5 (b) authorizes the Pres-
ident, during war or presidentially declared national emergency, to
* BA., Sir George Williams University, 1959; M.Litt., Dublin University, 1961;
B.C.L., McGill University, 1964; LL.M., Harvard University, 1965; Member of
the Massachusetts Bar; Associate, Bingham, Dana & Gould, Boston, Massachusetts.
** A.B., Princeton University, 1963; LL.B., Harvard University, 1967; Member of
the Massachusetts Bar; Associate, Bingham, Dana & Gould, Boston, Massachusetts.
Exec. Order No. 11387, 3 CF.R. 90 (Comp. 1968), 12 U.S.C. § 95(a) (Supp. IV,
1969).
2
 15 C.F.R. §§ 1000.101-.1301 (Supp. 1969), as amended, 33 Fed. Reg. 806 (1968).
For a detailed discussion of the application of the FDIR see "Part Two: Operational
Aspects of the Foreign Direct Investment Regulations," infra p. 175.
8 Exec. Order No. 11387(1)(a), 3 C.F.R. 90 (Comp. 1968), 12 U.S.C. § 95(a) (Supp.
IV, 1969) ; 15 C.F.R. § 1000.201 (1969).
4 Id.
5 12 U.S.C. § 95(a) (1964).
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regulate trade and financial transactions between Americans and
foreign persons.°
Section 5(b) and subsequent amendments to it authorize regula-
tions only in response to conditions of extreme emergency.? The pri-
mary purpose of the FDIR is to reduce the American balance of
payments deficit.° However, the continued tolerance of that deficit
by Congress and the President for several years prior to the issuance
of the FDIR, indicates that the deficit itself cannot be regarded as
a national emergency of sufficient magnitude to warrant the invoca-
tion of the President's section 5(b) powers. In recognition of this,
the President justified the Executive Order by citing the continued
existence of the national emergency declared by President Truman
in 1950, in response to both the invasion of Korea by Communist
China and the dangers of communist aggression (the Korean emer-
gency).° But clearly by 1968 the Korean War was over and the dan-
gers of communist aggression were not nearly as imminent as they
had been in 1950. Thus, the propriety and, indeed, the constitutional
validity of basing the FDIR on a national emergency declared in re-
6 Section 5(b), as amended, reads in part:
(1) During the time of war or during any other period of national emergency
declared by the President, the President may, through any agency that he may
designate, or otherwise, and under such rules and regulations as he may pre-
scribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise—
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange,
transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking institu-
tion, and the importing, exporting, hoarding, melting, or earmarking of gold
or silver coin or bullion, currency, or securities, and
(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or pro-
hibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transporta-
tion, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right,
power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving any property in
which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest.
12 U.S.C. § 95(a) (1) (A)-(B) (1964).
7 See Act of March 9, 1933, ch. 1, § 2, 48 Stat. 1.
8 Exec. Order No. 11387, 3 C.F.R. 90 (Comp. 1968), 12 U.S.C. § 95(a) (Supp. IV,
1969).
9 Proclamation No. 2914, 3 C.F.R. 99 (Comp. 1949-53), 50 U.S.C. App. (notes pre-
ceding § 1) (1964). The prologue to the Proclamation reads in part:
[R]ecent events in Korea and elsewhere constitute a grave threat to the
peace of the world and imperil the efforts of this country and those of the
United Nations to prevent aggression and armed conflict ....
INAT]lorld conquest by communist imperialism is the goal of the forces of
aggression that have been loosed upon the world ....
[T]he increasing menace of the forces of communist aggression requires
that the national defense of the United States be strengthened as speedily as
possible . .
Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson noted the continuance of this emergency
in their executive orders. Exec. Order No. 10896, 3 C.F.R. 425 (Comp. 1959-63);
Exec. Order No. 10905, 3 C.F.R. 436 (Comp. 1959-63) ; Exec. Order No. 11037, 3 C.F.R.
621 (Comp. 1959-63), 12 U.S.C. § 95(a) (1964) ; Exec. Order No. 11387, 3 C.F.R. 90
(Comp. 1968), 12 U.S.C. § 95(a) (Supp. IV, 1969). •
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sponse to an international situation which no- longer existed were
seriously questioned at the time." Moreover, President Nixon's recent
statements that the United States and the communist nations can
and must live together in harmony is further indication that the as-
sumptions underlying the declaration of the Korean emergency are
no longer valid, and that its continued use as support for the FDIR
is of dubious propriety."
10 See, e.g., Address by Russell Baker, American Management Association Meeting,
April 8-10, 1968, in CCH Balance of Payments Rep. 9032.
11
 The FDIR are not the only regulations adopted pursuant to § 5(b) which fail to
respond to the national emergencies they were designed to cure. The Foreign Assets
Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.101-.809 (Supp. 1969), which prohibit unlicensed
commercial transactions of any kind between China, North Korea, North Vietnam, in-
cluding nationals thereof, and American persons or foreign affiliates of American per-
sons, block American assets owned by nationals of the designated countries, and which
prohibit the unlicensed importation of "presumptively Chinese" merchandise from any
country, were issued in 1950 in response to the Chinese invasion of Korea and after the
declaration of the Korean emergency. Although justified at the time by events in Korea,
the propriety of their continued existence pursuant to the Korean emergency is question-
able.
The Egyptian Assets Control Regulations, 21 Fed. Reg. 5777 (1956), as amended,
21 Fed. Reg. 5861-62 (1956) (repealed 1958), which were almost identical to the
Foreign Assets Control Regulations, were issued in 1956 in response to the Suez crisis, but
again pursuant to the Korean emergency.
The Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.101-.809 (Supp. 1969),
which prohibit unlicensed commercial transactions of any kind between Cuba, or na-
tionals thereof, and American persons, and block American assets owned by Cuban
nationals, are also almost identical to the Foreign Assets Control Regulations, except for
a limited exemption in respect of trade with Cuba by foreign affiliates of United States
persons. These regulations were issued in 1961 in response to communist ascendancy in
Cuba, but partly pursuant to the Korean emergency.
A trade embargo, in the form of a prohibition of imports from Cuba, was declared
by President Kennedy, Proclamation No. 3447, 3 C.F.R. 157 (Comp. 1959-63), pur-
suant to authority vested in him by § 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. 22
U.S.C. § 2370 (1964). The Secretary of the Treasury issued the original Cuba embargo
pursuant to power delegated to him in that Proclamation. That embargo was limited
to a prohibition against imports from Cuba. Cuba Import Regulations, 27 Fed. Reg.
1116 (1962). It was revoked and replaced by the present Cuba embargo on July 19,
1963. 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.101-.809 (Supp. 1969). The present Cuba embargo is much
broader in scope than the mere prohibition of imports contained in Proclamation No.
3447. For example, under the present regulations the contents of a safe deposit box in
which a Cuban national has any interest are virtually frozen. 31 C.F.R. §§ 515
.201(b)(1), .311 (1969).
The new regulations were not issued pursuant to a new executive order or procla-
mation. As authority, in addition to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, they cite
§ 5(b) and Executive Orders 9193 and 9989. 31 C.F.R. 467 (Supp. 1966). These execu-
tive orders were issued on July 6, 1942 and August 20, 1945, respectively. In these
orders the President delegated his powers under § 5(b) to the Secretary of the
Treasury. Exec. Order No. 9193, 3 C.F.R. 1174 (Comp. 1938-43), 50 U.S.C. App. § 6
(1964); Exec. Order No. 9989, 3 C.F.R. 748 (Comp. 1943-48), 50 U.S.C. App. § 6
(1964). Thus, in issuing the present Cuba embargo the Secretary drew both on power
delegated to him in 1962 under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and power delegated
to his predecessor during and immediately after World War II under § 5(b). In
Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank, 361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1966), a case in which the
constitutionality of the Cuba embargo was challenged, the court assumed that the
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When the Department of Commerce implemented President John-
son's order by issuing the FDIR the Executive Department was
severely criticized." The vehemence of the criticism stemmed largely
from the suddenness and great restrictive impact of the regulations,
and the power of the affected interests." This criticism sufficiently
disturbed Secretary of Commerce Trowbridge that he requested an
advocate's brief establishing the legality of the FDIR. The Attorney
General complied in a letter to the Secretary in which he concluded
that the FDIR were "authorized by the statutory provisions codified"
in Section 5 (b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act.'
While the language of section 5(b) is undoubtedly broad enough
to sustain, under certain circumstances, regulations requiring the
repatriation of foreign assets and limiting foreign investments, the At-
torney General disregarded some hard questions of law in asserting
that the necessary circumstances in fact existed. In particular, two
questions are presented by President Johnson's use of "the continued
existence of the national emergency declared by [President Truman—
regulations were issued pursuant only to § 5(b) and did not discuss the authority of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
Regulations governing the hoarding of gold were issued by President Roosevelt in
1933 in response to economic effects of the Depression, and pursuant to the national
emergency declared by him on August 28, 1933. Exec. Order No. 6260, 1 C.F.R. 2.2
(1933), 12 U.S.C. § 95 (a) 1964. But the Gold Hoarding Regulations were continued
by later Presidents, pursuant to the Korean emergency. Exec. Order No. 8785, 3 C.F.R.
948 (Comp. 1938-43), 12 U.S.C. § 95(a) (1964). Neither the Egypt embargo, the
Cuba embargo, nor the Gold Hoarding Regulations can reasonably be considered as
responsive to the Chinese invasion of Korea and only the China and Cuba embargoes
can fairly be said to be responsive to the dangers of communist aggression.
An additional question as to the propriety and constitutionality of the embargoes
and regulations presently in effect is raised by the fact that they were issued by the
Secretary of the Treasury. In 1942, President Roosevelt, acting within the purview of
§ 5(b) delegated his authority to the Secretary of the Treasury. President Truman, by
executive order, reaffirmed this delegation of authority in 1948. Exec. Order No. 9193,
3 C.F.R. 1174 (Comp. 1938-43), 50 U.S,C. App. § 6 (1964) ; Exec. Order No. 9989, 3
C.F.R. 748 (Comp. 1943-48), 50 U.S.C. App. § 6 (1964). From 1942 to 1948 two de-
clared national emergencies were in existence, a limited national emergency dating
from 1939 to protect American neutrality, and an unlimited national emergency dating
from 1941 in response to the emerging war. Proclamation No. 2350, 3 C.F.R. 112 (Comp.
1938-43), 50 U.S.C. App. (notes preceding § 1) (1964) ; Proclamation No. 2487, 3 C.F.R,
234 (Comp. 1938-43), 50 U.S.C. App. (notes preceding § 1) (1964). Both emergencies
have since been terminated and the delegations not renewed. Proclamation No. 2947, 3
C.F.R. 158 (Comp. 1949-53), 50 U.S.C. App. (notes preceding § 1) (1964). There have.been
no § 5 (b) delegations of presidential power to the Secretary under the Korean emergency,
and, with the exception of the Cuba embargo declared by President Kennedy, there has
not been a delegation of the President's powers to the Secretary to effect the embargoes
in question. Yet in spite of the fact that the power has not been formally delegated to
him, the Secretary of the Treasury has issued the China, Egypt and Cuba embargoes.
12 Address by Russell Baker, supra note 10.
13 Id.
14 CCH Balance of Payments Rep. 11 9031.
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the Korean emergency]," 15
 and the necessity of reducing the balance
of payments deficit during the national emergency, as authority for
the promulgation of the FDIR: (1) Does that emergency still exist
and (2) if so, does it justify these regulations? These are but variants
of the more basic questions of what justifies the declaration and
continuance of a national emergency under section 5 (b), and whether
a declaration of national emergency under that section justifies the
issuance of particular regulations promulgated in response thereto.
These questions have been raised before but courts have avoided ex-
ploring them fully and candidly.' 6
This article examines the constitutionality of the FDIR and sim-
ilar regulations issued pursuant to section 5(b), and comments upon
the basic propriety and desireability of delegations of broad emer-
gency powers to the President. The development of executive powers
under section 5(b) will first be discussed with an eye toward deter-
mining, through the legislative history, congressional intent under-
lying the section. The role of judicial review of the exercise of execu-
tive emergency powers will be examined, followed by an analysis of
the theory underlying the delegation of such powers to the President.
Finally, the constitutional limitations on the emergency powers of
the executive will be examined.
It is concluded that, although the ,limits of presidential power
are not clearly defined, the Constitution vests primary authority for
the exercise of section 5(b) powers in Congress, and that the President,
particularly in non-wartime situations, exercises those powers as an
agent of Congress. While it has not as yet provided clear guidelines
for determining the existence of a "national emergency," Congress
should establish such criteria, including provisions for judicial review
of executive actions under section 5(b), so as to retain the power
originally vested in that body by the Constitution.
15
 Proclamation No. 2914, 3 C.F.R. 99 (Comp. 1949-53), 50 U.S.C. App. (notes
preceding § 1) (1964).
16
 The FDIR and other regulations issued pursuant to § 5(b) have raised additional
constitutional issues. One of the most persistent questions relates to due process con-
siderations in the denial of authorizations or licenses. For a discussion of this problem
in relation to the Cuba embargo, see Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank, 361 F.2d 106
(2d Cir. 1966). Another question arising under the China, Egypt and Cuba embargoes,
relates to possible violations of freedom of speech and the press in prohibiting the im-
portation of printed matter from embargoed countries. Although it was held in Teague
v. Regional Comm'r of Customs, 404 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 89 S.Ct. 1457
(1969), that such prohibition violated no constitutional rights, it seems clear from the
principles of Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965), that such were violated.
Justice Black enunciated this in his dissent to the denial of certiorari in the Teague case
and pointed out that certiorari was denied only because the petition was delayed beyond
the 90-day deadline by a snowstorm. 89 S. Ct. at 1457.
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 5(b)
Originally, section 5 (b) authorized presidential action only during
time of war. It was enacted as part of the Trading with the Enemy
Act' six months after America's entry into World War I. The
Act was regarded solely as a war measure; its purpose was to pre-
vent the use of American property to aid the enemy, and to assure
that the debts of alien enemies to Americans would be paid. 18 During
World War I, section 5 (b) was amended to authorize the President to
regulate the hoarding of gold up to two years after the end of the
War.'°
After World War I, section 5 (b) was not invoked until President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, believing that the economic emergency of the
Depression warranted the use of the President's war powers,' declared
a bank holiday." Since section 5(b) at that time authorized pres-
idential action only during war, the President's authority for this
proclamation was far from clear. One court commented:
Although this section was cheerfully accepted, and even wel-
comed, at the time, it was clearly unauthorized, since no-
where in the Constitution is the President given authority to
act in an "emergency" as such, and the requisite war condi-
tions which might have called into play his granted power
as Commander-in-Chief or his delegated power under the
Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 did not obtain."
On March 9, 1933, at the President's request, Congress passed the
Emergency Banking Act" which ratified the President's actions" and
amended the Act to allow the President to exercise section 5(b) powers
during declared national emergencies as well as during wars. 25 That
17 Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411.
18 Koehler v. Clark, 170 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1948) ; Plfueger v. United States, 121
F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 617 (1941).
To accomplish these purposes, the Act forbade foreign trade without a license,
provided for the seizure of enemy owned property in the United States, and authorized
the President to regulate transactions in foreign exchange.
The Act was repeatedly challenged as violating the due process and just compensa-
tion clauses of the Fifth Amendment by authorizing the Alien Property Custodian to
seize and hold enemy owned property with deferred or perhaps no compensation. But
courts found that the Act was based on the power of Congress to make rules for capture
on land and sea, a war power, and such was not subject to the restraints of the Fifth
Amendment, at least during time of war. See Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239 (1921) ;
N.V. Montan Export-Metaal, etc. v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 1016 (Ct. Cl. 1952).
10 Act of Sept. 24, 1918, ch. 176, § 5, 40 Stat. 966.
20 See G. Schubert, The Presidency in the Courts 257 (1957).
21 Proclamation No. 2039, 31 C.F.R. § 120.1 (1933).
22 United States v. Briddle, 212 F. Supp. 584, 586 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
23 Act of March 9, 1933, ch. 1, 48 Stat. 1.
24 Act of March 9, 1933, ch. 1, § 1 48 Stat. 1. Congress again ratified actions taken by
the President under § 5(b) in the Act of Jan. 30, 1934, ch. 6, § 13, 48 Stat. 343.
25 Act of March 9, 1933, ch. 1, § 2, 48 Stat. 1.
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legislation also authorized the President to exercise these powers
"through any agency he may delegate J"26
In 1940, as the nation moved toward war, the President re-
quested that Congress further amend the section to authorize him to
regulate transactions in which foreign countries and foreign nationals '
have an interest. Congress complied with the request,' but the debate
indicated that it regarded the amendment as a war measure.' In
1931, when President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8785 further
restricting such international transactions," he again asked Congress
to ratify his actions and to broaden the scope of section 5(b).3° It
did so in the First War Powers Act31 on December 18, 1941.
Nowhere in section 5(b) did Congress define the term "national
emergency." Some indication of its intent, however, may be gained
by reviewing the legislative history of the section. It has been men-
tioned that the section as originally enacted in 1917 delegated powers
to the President only in time of war,' and was part of a statute which
was regarded solely as a war measure." When it was amended in
1933 to delegate powers to the President during declared national
emergencies, the debate indicates that Congress intended to act only
in regard to the Depression emergency. The circumstances sur-
rounding passage of the amendment bear this out. The amendment
was imbedded in a bill reorganizing the nation's banking structure'
which the President presented to Congress in fully drafted form. He
requested Congress to pass the Act before midnight, when the pre-
viously declared bank holiday would expire. Several Senators and
Congressmen indicated that they would never vote for an act which
contained so many objectionable provisions, of which the amend-
ment to section 5(b) was one, but for the immediate necessity of
meeting the crisis at hand." And when section 5(b) was amended
28 Act of March 9, 1933, ch. 1, § 2, 48 Stat. 1.
27
 Act of May 7, 1940, ch. 185, § 1, 54 Stat. 179.
28 86 Cong. Rec. 5183 (1940) (remarks of Senator Taft).
29
 Exec. Order No. 8785, 3 C.F.R. 948 (Comp. 1938-43), 12 U.S.C. § 95(a) (1964).
So Exec. Order No. 8389, 3 C.F.R. 645 (Comp. 1938-43), 12 U.S.C. § 95(a) (1964) ;
Exec. Order No. 8405, 3 C.F.R. 657 (Comp. 1938-43), 12 U.S.C. § 95(a) (1964) ; Exec.
Order No. 8446, 3 C.F.R. 674 (Comp. 1938-43), 12 U.S.C. § 95(a) (1964) ; Exec.
Order No. 8484, 3 C.F.R. 687 (Comp. 1938-43), 12 U.S.C. § 95(a) (1964).
31
 Act of Dec. 18, 1941, ch. 593, § 301, 55 Stat. 839.
82 Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411.
33 Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239 (1921).
84
 Act of March 9, 1933, ch. 1, 48 Stat. 1.
35
 The amendment to § 5(b) delegating power to the President during a national'
emergency as well as during war must constitute one of the most extraordinary chapters
in Congressional history. President Roosevelt's declaration of a bank holiday on March
6, 1933 was based on the then dubious authority of § 5(b). The holiday was due to
expire at midnight of March 9, 1933. Congress was not in session at the time but
Roosevelt called it into session.on March 9th, presented it with a sweeping bill dealing
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again during World War II, congressional debate indicates that Con-
gress was responding only to the demands of the War." Although
Congress has never defined the term "national emergency," the con-
texts within which it enacted and amended the section indicate that
it intended the term to denote a crisis of drastic proportions. This
would comport with the popular understanding of the term.
Some further indication of congressional intent may be gleaned
from the rationale behind the congressional delegation of emergency
powers generally. In this regard Professor Corwin points out that,
whereas legislative power is fairly well defined by method as well as
by function, executive power
is still indefinite as to function and retains, particularly
when exercised by single individual, much of its original plas-
ticity as to method. It is consequently the power of govern-
ment that is the most spontaneously responsive to emergency
conditions; conditions that is which have not attained enough
stability of recurrency to admit of their being dealt with ac-
cording to rule."
Emergencies and crises require the ability to respond quickly and
decisively, with one purpose and direction, as well as with flexibility
of method. It is the inability of Congress to act in this manner that
necessitates delegation of power to the President in time of crisis,
with the banking crisis, of which the amendment to § 5(b) was part, and demanded
passage of the unaltered bill by midnight. Senator Fletcher, who introduced and managed
the bill in the Senate, asked that it be sent immediately to the Banking and Currency
Committee and that the Committee be instructed to report the bill out in an hour.
Senator Long complained that he had been unable to discover the contents of the bill
before it was read by the clerk. Other senators complained that it had not been printed
and was not available to read. Most of the debate centered on what many senators
thought to be unfair treatment of small state banks in favor of members of the Federal
Reserve System in some of the substantive sections of the bill. Senator Long made a
passing remark on the extraordinary powers being given to the President in the amend-
ment to § 5(b). Senator Robinson of Indiana objected to a provision ratifying actions
taken by the President "heretofore and hereafter" pursuant to § 5(b), feeling that open-
ended prospective ratification was out of order. Senator Reed reassured Robinson that
the language was surplusage. "If President Roosevelt should go beyond the section of
the Trading with the Enemy Act, the approval we are giving him would be of no
effect . . . . (W]e do not confirm and approve any future act unless it is in compliance
with Section 5 of the Act of October 16, 1917. . . ." 77 Cong. Rec. 60 (1933). Most
senators seemed to have serious reservations on many of the bill's sections and agreed
they would not vote for it under ordinary circumstances. The bill was passed before
midnight. Id. at 49-67. The action on the bill in the House was similar. Id. at 75-85.
36 In the Congressional debates on December 16, 1941, Representative Fish, insisting
that the powers being delegated to President Roosevelt were no greater than those
delegated to President Wilson during World War I, said that they were "Lplowers that
are necessary in time of war and which we would not consider giving to any President
in peace time . . . that should be returned to the Congress when the war has been
won." 87 Cong. Rec. 9856 (1941).
37 E. Corwin, The President 3 (4th ed. 1957).
150
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT REGULATIONS
and may account for the fact that many of our great Presidents held
office during crisis or war. However, once the crisis has passed Con-
gress is again capable of responding to the policy making needs of
the nation. Therefore, by way of defining the limits of section 5 (b)
emergencies, when Congress is again capable of responding to those
needs the national emergency, it would seem, no longer exists.
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE REGULATIONS ISSUED IN
RESPONSE TO NATIONAL EMERGENCIES
As the legislative history of section 5(b) and the rationale behind
congressional delegation of emergency power indicate, it is possible
to construct a method by which courts can review the propriety of
the issuance or continuance of regulations pursuant to a particular
national emergency. Congress delegates its power to effect remedial
measures during a national emergency because the existence of the
emergency makes it difficult, if not impossible, for Congress to ef-
fectively respond to the crisis. The propriety of presidential exer-
cise of this delegated power, therefore, turns on whether conditions
exist which make it difficult or impossible for Congress to legislate
measures which will have the desired effect. Although this criteria is
somewhat vague, it, can easily be applied to those cases where the
conditions underlying a declared national emergency obviously do
or do not lend themselves to effective congressional action. As to
those cases covering the middle ground, courts will, in all likelihood,
always defer to the President's discretion in exercising his delegated
powers, no matter how clearly developed the criteria for judging the
exercise of that discretion may be.
But although courts could have developed the suggested criteria
for reviewing the appropriateness of the issuance of regulations pur-
suant to section 5(b), they have been reluctant to undertake such
review. The opinion of the District Court for the Southern District of
California in Werner v. United States's epitomizes this reluctance. There
the plaintiff sought to recover land which he had been forced to lease to
the government at nominal rent during World War II. The lease,
pursuant to statute, provided for termination six months following
the expiration of the World War II emergencies. Congress by joint
resolution terminated several statutes, including the statute on which
the lease was based. The expiration dates of these statutes would have
otherwise depended on the expiration of those emergencies. The owner
argued that the emergencies, and hence his lease, had been terminated
by this joint resolution: The -court, rather than rejecting the plaintiff's
argument by referring to the obvious meaning and intent of the res-
38 119 F. Supp. 894 (S.D. Cal. 1954), aff'd on other grounds, 233 F.2d 52 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 842 (1956).
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olution, developed an elaborate opinion holding that a court cannot
terminate a presidentially declared national emergency:
There has been no contention that anyone other than
the President may issue a Proclamation determining the ex-
istence of a national emergency. There is no suggestion that
the other two branches of government, or either of them—
judicial or legislative—may in any way usurp the duties of
the President by declaring the existence of a national emer-
gency. If the President is the only one who may declare a
national emergency, is he alone empowered to terminate it?
It seems to this court the determination that a national
emergency existed is a matter of political judgment, and de-
termination that the national emergency no longer exists is
also a matter of political discernment, which judges have
"neither technical competence nor official responsibility" to
decide. If this is a matter which has been given exclusively
to the executive branch of government and the judicial
branch has no official responsibility therein, it would also
seem to this court that the legislative branch has no right
to determine matters of political judgment."
The opinion was affirmed on other grounds by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit. However, the court of appeals suggested
in a footnote to its opinion that a court, in appropriate circumstances,
could hold that a declared national emergency in fact no longer
existed:4
 The circuit court's suggestion that the lower court's analy-
sis is deficient is correct for several reasons. It is meaningless to con-
tend that Congress is not a political branch of the government, fully
competent to determine matters of political judgment. Therefore, it
is clear that Congress as well as the President may declare that an
emergency exists and take appropriate action:" Moreover, it is not at
all established that courts have no "official responsibility" in the mat-
ter of determining the existence of a national emergency:4 Although
national emergencies under section 5 (b) are declared by the President,
they are declared pursuant to authority delegated by Congress. And,
of course, it is the "official responsibility" of courts to declare
whether the executive branch is within its statutory or constitutional
authority in taking a particular action.
Just as in the district court decision in Werner, the court in
39 119 F. Supp. at 896.
4o 233 F.2d at 55 n.2.
41 The Court approved legislation of this type in Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135
(1921).
42 See Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1923).
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MacEwan v. Rusk" refused to consider whether a declared national
emergency continued to exist. There a declaratory judgment was
sought to invalidate regulations of the Secretary of State which denied
endorsement of passports for travel to and from Cuba. These regula-
tions were based on the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
which provides that the President may restrict the travel of American
citizens during a declared national emergency. 44
 When the regula-
tions were challenged on the ground that they were issued pursuant
to the Korean emergency which no longer in fact existed, the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit bluntly replied that "a court may
not lightly hold that an executive proclamation of a national emer-
gency has expired by lapse of time,”" and concluded that, in any
event, "[w]orld-wide events make it clear to everyone that the national
emergency is not ended.""
Similarly, in Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank, 47 the plaintiff chal-
lenged the continued duration of the Korean emergency, contending
that it could not support the Cuba embargo. Although Judge Friendly,
writing for the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, could easily
have disposed of this question by ruling that the embargo was spe-
cifically authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 48 he was
not content to base his decision on this ground. Rather, he ruled
against the plaintiff, for the reason that "courts will not review a
determination so peculiarly within the province of the chief execu-
tive . . . .'"9
 His ruling, that the determination of the existence of a
national emergency is solely within the province of the President,
comes closer to traditional doctrine than the rationale of the Werner
and MacEwan courts. In fact, this doctrine may be traced to Justice
Story who, in 1812, said, "Mt does not belong to the court to super-
intend the acts of the executive, nor to decide on circumstances left
to his sole discretion. 759
The reticence exhibited by the courts in reviewing the continued
existence of declared national emergencies results, as Judge Friendly
indicated, from a reluctance to interfere in matters left to presidential
discretion. In this regard Professor Corwin has pointed out that judi-
cial review has been of minor importance in delineating the scope of
presidential powers:
43 228 F. Supp. 306 (E.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd, 344 F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1965).
44 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1964).
45 228 F. Supp. at 312.
48 Id,
47 361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1966).
48 22 U.S.C. § 2364 (1964). See note 11, supra.
49 361 F.2d at 109. However, he indicated that the existence of a national emergency
could hardly be doubted when thousands of American troops were in combat abroad and
stationed in readiness around the globe. Id.
60
 The Orono, 18 F. Cas. 830 (No. 10,585) (C.C.D. Mass. 1812).
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While the Court has sometimes rebuffed presidential preten-
sions, it has more often labored to rationalize them; but most
of all it has sought on one pretext or another to keep its sickle
out of this "dread field."'
This conclusion is based on a .
 line of cases beginning in 1827 with
Martin v. Mott," wherein the President's power to call the militia
into service during an invasion or threat of invasion, pursuant to a
statute delegating him that power, was challenged by a militiaman
who had been fined for refusing to answer such a call during the War
of 1812. Justice Story asserted that the Court had no business second-
guessing a determination made by the President concerning a matter
left to his discretion by Congress.° This case has been cited in recent
opinions which have refused to question the President's judgment
concerning the existence of a national emergency."
Constitutional attitudes have not remained static since 1827. In
reviewing the evolution of judicial review of executive determinations,
Professors Jaffe and Davis have stated that the attitudes and actions of
the judiciary in regard to such review are far from settled. In fact, they
conclude that a presumption of reviewability has slowly emerged over
the past few decades; a presumption which is rebuttable, however,
by an indication of legislative intent to the contrary or a special reason
for nonreviewability. 55
One such basis for nonreviewability arises when the matter in
question concerns foreign affairs .° It was for this reason that the
Court in Oetjen v. Central Leather Co. 87 and United States v. Pink" re-
fused to review executive determinations concerning the recognition of
foreign governments, and in Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman
S.S. Corp." refused to review the President's determination that an
international air route should be granted to one domestic air line
rather than to another. The Court in the latter case said:
It would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant in-
formation, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the
Executive taken on information properly held secret . But
even if courts could require full disclosure, the very nature
51
 E. Corwin, supra note 37, at 16. Professor Corwin is not alone in making this ob-
servation. See also G. Schubert, The Presidency in the Courts 271 (1957).
62 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
53 Id. at 27-28.
54
 See, e.g., Brown v. Bernstein, 49 F. Supp. 728, 732 (M.D. Pa. 1943) ; United
States v. Switchmens Union, 97 P. Supp. 97, 101 (W.D.N.Y. 1950).
55
 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law §§ 28.01, .07 (1958) ; L. Jaffe, Judicial Control
of Administrative Action, ch. 9 (1965).
50
 L. Jaffe, supra note 55 at 363-66.
67 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
58 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
59 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
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of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not
judicial. . . . They are delicate, complex, and involve large
elements of prophecy. . . . They are decisions of a kind
for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor
responsibility . . .80
But these considerations are largely irrelevant to a judicial con-
sideration of the continued existence of a national emergency, even
if it has been declared in response to international events. In making
such a determination a court does not act on incomplete information,
for an emergency of the sort justifying the exercise of delegated emer-
gency powers depends on apparent facts, which are readily ascertain-
able without the sophisticated information-gathering apparatus avail-
able to the President. In making such a determination, a court does
not directly challenge a presidential decision, for the continued ex-
istence of an emergency does not result as much from a presidential
decision, that is, a conscious choice, as from inertia or the absence
of any decision.
In the case of Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair," the Supreme Court
not only indicated that judicial review of the continued existence of
emergencies is proper, but ordered that the review be made. This
case arose from a bill in equity to restrain the Rent Commissioner of
Washington, D.C. from lowering rents for apartments in an order
of August 7, 1922. The Rent Commission was created by Congress in
1919 to deal with a housing shortage created by the vastly increased
government personnel requirements during World War I. The measure
was declared to be emergency legislation and was to terminate in
two years unless repealed. When initially asked in Block v. Hirsch62
to consider the deprivation of landlords' property rights by the rent
control law, the Court was reluctant to question the emergency
measure. "A limit in time, to tide over a passing trouble, may well
justify a law that could not be upheld as a permanent change. 783
However, when Congress extended the Act until 1924, Justice
Holmes, in Chastleton, reiterated the Court's earlier statements re-
garding the respect due congressional declarations of emergency, but
qualified the extent to which such declarations would be respected.
But even as to them a court is not at liberty to shut its eyes
to an obvious mistake, when the validity of the law depends
upon the truth of what is declared.... A law depending upon
the existence of an emergency or other certain state of facts
60 Id. at 111.
61 264 U.S. 543 (1923).
02 256 U.S. 13.5 (1921).
63 Id. at 157.
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to uphold it may cease to operate if the emergency ceases
or the facts change even though valid when passed."
But rather than determine itself whether an emergency con-
tinued to exist, the Court remanded the case for that determination.
Of course, the rent control regulations under consideration in Chastle-
ton were based upon a congressionally declared emergency, whereas
the FDIR are based upon a presidentially declared emergency. But the
reasoning of Holmes, quoted above, is equally applicable to both
types of declarations. Moreover, regulations issued pursuant to sec-
tion 5(b) depend on a delegation of authority from Congress. Pres-
idential action pursuant to that delegation should be no more immune
from judicial scrutiny than the underlying congressional action. If
Congress' declaration of an emergency is reviewable, then the Pres-
ident's declaration of an emergency when he is acting for Congress
should also be reviewable. This position was supported by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in a footnote to its opinion in Werner v.
United States" wherein it indicated that it considered executive
declarations of emergency, under proper circumstances, to be review-
able:
While the tendency is to leave the determination of the end of
emergency to the executive branch, it is conceivable that in-
ternational affairs could again achieve such placidity that a
court could venture to take judicial notice that an emergency
had ended, absent any such determination by the executive."
Later, in the case of Bauer v. United States' the court partially re-
134 264 U.S. at 547-48.
65 233 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1956).
66 Id. at 55 n.2.
67 244 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1957).
In this 1957 case the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to overturn a
conviction for the possession of gold bullion in violation of the Gold Hoarding Regula-
tions issued under the authority of § 5(b). Those regulations were challenged on the
ground that the economic emergency of the Depression no longer existed and therefore
no longer could justify criminal prosecutions in the 1950's. The court acknowledged the
merit of this argument:
It seems vital as a matter of national policy that emergency regulations and
almost dictatorial powers granted or conceded in the turmoil of war, cold
war, economic revolution and the struggle to preserve a balanced democratic
way of life, should be discarded upon return to normal conditions, lest we grow
used to them as the fittings of ordinary existence. Executive regulations drafted
and confirmed for an emergency should expire with the emergency. There will
be time enough to revivify these if another emergency requires and Congress be
willing. Of course, if it seems essential to continue the subject matter of these
criminal regulations now, Congress can so declare. But the power lies in Congress.
Id. at 797.
However, the court was unwilling to follow the logic of this reasoning to its
conclusion and refused to consider whether the Depression emergency had ended by
1957. "This Court should not declare the end of any emergency as matter of law. Nor,
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affirmed this position when it remanded the case for a determination of
the continued existence of the Depression emergency.
Finally, in 1962 the District Court for the Southern District of
California judically noted the end of a presidentially declared national
emergency in United States v. Briddle." This case arose from another
conviction for the possession of gold bullion in violation of the same
Gold Hoarding Regulations at issue in the Bauer case. The court
declared:
It is a simple matter, of course, to date the commence-
ment of a "national emergency" by its declaration. But unless
the ending be marked by proclamation also it is sometimes
difficult indeed to determine. Yet, always at some point the
"national emergency" does end, and the Orders which find
their authority in the existence of the emergency lose their
validity. . . . [I ] t is now too clear for debate, as a matter
of common knowledge, that the 1933 economic emergency
ended long before 1962. Accordingly, this court should and
does now judicially notice the fact."
Briddle was disapproved in United States v. Lane" and overruled
in Pike v. United States. 71 However, the basis of these later opinions
was not that the Depression emergency survived and continued to jus-
tify the Gold Hoarding Regulations, but rather that the regulations
were supported by other, subsequently declared emergencies. Signif-
icantly, the government conceded in the Pike case that the Depression
emergency no longer existed, despite the failure of the President to ter-
minate it formally.
III. THE THEORY OF EXECUTIVE EMERGENCY POWERS I
RE-EXAMINED
Emerging from this line of cases is judicial recognition of a fact
that must have been obvious to the general public throughout the
1950's and 1960's: the Depression emergency no longer exists. A
court has declared it so; the government has conceded the fact. This
leads to the significant conclusion that declared national emergencies
not only end when formally terminated by the President, as the World
War II emergencies were terminated by President Truman in 1952, 72
except under most exceptional circumstances, should judicial notice be taken by us of
conditions from which we might be inclined to conclude an emergency has ended." Id.
The court remanded the case for a finding on the issue. Id.
as 212 F. Supp. 584 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
69
 Id. at 588-89.
70 218 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
71
 340 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1965).
72 Proclamation No. 2974, 3 C.F.R. 158 (Comp. 1949-53), 50 U.S.C. App. (notes pre-
ceding § 1) (1964).
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but also can die natural deaths. From this determination that an
emergency can and does cease to exist when the conditions underlying
it have disappeared, it follows that the regulations dependent on that
emergency should be considered terminated. If the President fails to
act in this regard, it is the duty of courts to do so.
It must be admitted that the Depression emergency, under con-
sideration in the Bauer and Briddle cases, was undeniably more
dead in the 1950's than the Korean emergency, under consideration
in the Sardino and MacEwan cases, was in the 1960's. The Depression
emergency was declared solely in response to the economic crisis of
the Depression—a crisis which had wholly passed by the mid-1950's.
The Korean emergency, however, was declared in response to both
the Chinese invasion of South Korea and "communist aggression" in
general. While the Korean incident has receded far enough into the -
background so that it no longer merits national emergency status, and
in any event bears no relation to the various regulations the Korean
emergency now supports, the dangers of communist aggression, how-
ever diminished, still exist and do bear a relation to many of these
regulations. This raises the first question initially posed; whether
potential communist aggression, as opposed to particular manifes-
tations of communist aggression, is too general a matter to support
the declaration of a national emergency. Today, when any hostile or
even defensive act by an unfriendly nation may be labeled aggressive,
and when any act of violence, internal or external, will be viewed
by many to be communist inspired, any national emergency declared in
response to potential communist aggression may well be viewed as
continuous in nature." If Congress had intended to delegate the sec-
tion 5 (b) powers in such an open-ended manner it would have done so
by delegating them without the necessity of declaring a national emer-
gency. However, since Congress delegated those powers only during
time of war or national emergency it must have meant those phrases as
limitations upon the president's authority. For these limitations to be
meaningful the emergency must denote a crisis of sufficient specificity
to have a definite, ascertainable end. If the operative language in the
declaration of the Korean emergency includes all the dangers of com-
munist aggression and not just the dangers surrounding the war crisis,
that declaration may well be too intangible and too general to actually
be a national emergency.
The FDIR were issued by President Johnson to meet the bal-
ance of payments problem. He issued them pursuant to his section
73 That this seems to have been forgotten becomes apparent when one comes to
realize that some 60% of the nation's population have lived their entire lives during a
continuous, unbroken chain of national emergencies. Yet some of the years since 1933
have seemed relatively calm and no one continuing emergency has pervaded all of them.
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5(b) powers, under the presupposition that the Korean emergency
continued to exist. If a court were to review the validity of the FDIR
using the criteria suggested above, it might determine that the events
underlying the Korean emergency no longer exist and, thus, no longer
prevent Congress from fully and effectively legislating in regard to
foreign investment by Americans. It could therefore be concluded that
the Korean emergency no longer supports the issuance of the FDIR
under section 5(b).
The second question initially posed and raised again by the Lane
and Pike cases is: if a declared national emergency continues to exist,
what regulations may it justify? Circumstances of varying types and
severity, from near war to the flooding of the Ohio River, could jus-
tify the declaration of a national emergency. Clearly, regulations jus-
tified by a near war would not be responsive to, and therefore could
not be justified by, an emergency declared in response to a regional
natural disaster, as this would be inconsistent with the rationale under-
lying emergency delegation. Congress delegates those powers which,
because of the particular emergency conditions involved, it cannot
otherwise effectively exercise. While near war conditions might render
it difficult for Congress to effectively regulate foreign commerce by
preventing trade with and, hence, aid to a potential enemy, the flood-
ing of the Ohio River obviously does not raise the same problems.
Thus, the President's use of section 5 (b) powers to regulate the flow
of American goods abroad would be justified by near war, but not
by a natural disaster.
Since courts have not considered the rationale behind emergency
delegation at any length, it is not surprising that they have failed to
consider whether specific regulations are justified by the particular
declared and existing national emergencies underlying them. Thus,
when the government admitted in the Pike case that the Depression
emergency, pursuant to which the Gold Hoarding Regulations were
issued, no longer existed, the court found only that the Korean emer-
gency still existed. It did not consider whether those regulations were
responsive to and justified by the conditions underlying the Korean
emergency. Under its reasoning the regulations would, apparently, be
equally well supported by any national emergency, including natural
disasters.
If the requirement of a logical relationship between a declared
national emergency and the regulations issued under it is implicit in
section 5(b), it appears that many of the regulations outstanding
under section 5 (b) are of questionable validity. Since the Depression
emergency no longer exists and the World War II emergencies have
been terminated, it must be concluded that the FDIR and similar reg-
ulations under section 5 (b), such as the Gold Hoarding Regulations,
159
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
and the China and Cuba embargoes, 74 exist pursuant solely to the
Korean emergency. Yet President Truman did not mention gold
hoarding, Cuba or the balance of payments deficits in proclaiming
the Korean emergency, and gold hoarding, Cuba and the balance of
payments deficit seem to have little relation to events in Korea. Even
potential communist aggression, if a term so broad can properly support
a declaration of national emergency, seems to have little to do with
gold hoarding or the balance of payments. Neither events in Korea
nor potential communist aggression presently prevent Congress from
conveniently and effectively dealing with the subjects of these various
regulations. In short, the issuance and continuance of these regula-
tions pursuant to the Korean emergency seriously distort the rationale
behind emergency delegation and may represent an abuse of dele-
gated emergency powers.
If a court were to judicially recognize the fact that the Korean
emergency has ended, it might be argued that the President, in effect,
could make its decision moot by declaring a Vietnamese emergency
and reissuing many of the present regulations pursuant to it. While
this is true, it oversimplifies the situation. If the President were com-
pelled to phase out declared national emergencies when the conditions
underlying them disappear, several developments might occur. One is
that for various periods of time there would probably be no declared
national emergencies and, hence, no emergency regulations in existence.
Presidents might also begin to issue responsive regulations pursuant
to particular, clearly defined emergencies. Both of these developments
are desirable for they focus attention on the fact that emergency
delegation is not permanent but is intended to cease when emergency
conditions disappear.
The danger of allowing emergency powers to assume the nature
of normal presidential powers is that this process contributes to the
unfettered growth of concentrated power in the Chief Executive. Sec-
tion 5 (b) is just one of many statutes delegating emergency powers
to the President, powers ranging from arming merchant vessels75 to
imposing travel restrictions on American citizens." It should be re-
membered that the President alone determines when and under what
conditions he may exercise the extraordinary powers delegated to him.
He alone declares the existence of the national emergency which gives
rise to such powers. In making this declaration he is guided, if at all,
only by the congressional guidelines suggested above, and is not re-
quired by the judiciary to follow even these guidelines. If he disre-
gards the intent of Congress, it can withdraw or modify the delegated
74 See supra note 11.
75 Act of June 29, 1948 at ch. 715, § 1, 62 Stat. 1095 (repealed 1956).
76 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1964).
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powers only over a presidential veto. The dangers of this situation
have not gone unrecognized. It was stated in the 1941 congressional
debates relating to the amendment of section 5(b): "we have to
retain power to control [the exercise of these delegated emergency
powers] . . . and we have to retain the power to recapture and dis-
tribute them when the emergency is over."" In this regard the warn-
ing issued by the Bauer court deserves close re-examination:
It seems vital as a matter of national policy that emergency
regulations and almost dictatorial powers granted or con-
ceded in the turmoil of war, cold war, economic revolution
and the struggle to preserve a balanced democratic way of
life, should be discarded upon return to normal conditions,
lest we grow used to them as the fittings of ordinary exis-
tence."
One respected student of executive authority has suggested that
a constitutional dictatorship can be, has been, and under proper cir-
cumstances should be, brought about through the use of such delega-
tion of legislative authority." However, while Presidents have en-
joyed relatively unfettered power during the Civil War and both
world wars, and while such powers may be necessary during active
wartime conflict, they are inappropriate when such conflict has passed
or during an "emergency" which by its own terms may never end
despite the passing of the crisis associated with it. The dangers of
broad delegations of emergency power could be reduced by providing
for judicial review of emergency delegations under existing statutes.
However, the position assumed by the courts indicates that judicial
review in all situations, not just the obvious extremes, is unlikely
to occur. A more effective approach may be the more careful structur-
ing of statutes delegating emergency powers. Congress should estab-
lish criteria for the declaration of a national emergency and should
charge courts with the responsibility of reviewing regulations issued
under an emergency to assure that those criteria are met and that the
regulations are responsive to the emergency. Congress should also
provide either that emergencies and regulations issued pursuant to
them expire automatically after a short, stated period of time, 8° or
that Congress by joint resolution may terminate any delegation of
77 87 Cong, Rec. 9858 (1941) (remarks of Congressman Sumners).
78 244 F.2d at 797.
79 C. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship (1948).
89 Limiting emergency delegations to a short stated period of time has a curious
precedent in a practice of the Roman Republic which made prominent private citizens
dictators in times of crisis but limited their terms to six months and provided that they
could not succeed themselves or that dictators could not exist for more than six months in
a year. The six month period is explained by the fact that the Romans fought only
during the summer at that time. Id. at 23.
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emergency powers, declared emergency, or regulation issued pursuant
to such emergency.
Congressional action to tighten control over the exercise of emer-
gency powers delegated to the President must, of course, be based
upon the existence of such powers in Congress. That is, the entire
question of the extent of congressional control over such presidential
actions depends upon whether the Constitution originally vests the
power delegated in Congress or the President. Thus, before determin-
ing to what degree Congress can limit the exercise of section 5(b)
powers by the President, it is necessary to determine the extent to
which Congress or the President may constitutionally exercise the
powers upon which the section focuses.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE EXECUTIVE'S
EMERGENCY POWERS
There can be no doubt that Congress, under its war powers," can
enact regulations of the sort contemplated in section 5(b) during
time of war. These war powers would also authorize such action during
a war-related national emergency, when war appeared imminent or
during the aftermath of war. 82
 At all other times Congress' foreign
commerce and currency powers" would justify such action. Congress'
ability under these powers to take actions of the sort contemplated in
section 5 (b) has never been challenged. Its ability to delegate author-
ity to the President to take such actions, however, has been challenged
in cases arising under section 5 (b) regulations, 84
 although these chal-
lenges have been based on the now discredited doctrine that Congress
may not delegate its "legislative" powers."
81
 "War powers" is used here to describe various powers given to Congress in the
Constitution, including the powers to provide for the common defense, declare war,
grant letters of marquis and reprisal, make rules concerning captures on land and sea,
raise and support the army and navy, provide for the militia, call forth the militia, and
make such laws as are necessary and proper to carry out those powers. U.S. Const.
art. II, § 8.
82
 See Silesian-American Corp. v. Clark, 332 U.S. 469 (1947).
While a natural hesitancy exists against so interpreting the war power clause
as to expand its scope to cover incidents not intimately connected with war, we
think reasonable preparation for the storm of war is a proper exercise of the war




 These include the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, coin money,
regulate the value of foreign and domestic money and make such laws as are necessary
and proper to carry out those powers. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
84
 Teague v. Regional Comm'r of Customs, 404 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1968); Sardino
v. Federal Reserve Bank, 361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Von Clemm, 136
F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1943).
85
 The idea that Congress cannot delegate its "legislative" function may be traced
back at least to John Locke. Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Government, ch. XI
(1690). But it did not receive judicial sanction until the 1930's, when the Supreme Court
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The Constitution also vests certain war powers in the President,
the most notable of which is his designation as commander in chief
struck down the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 in the "Hot Oil" and "Sick
Chicken" cases. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The Court reasoned in both of these
cases that Congress had delegated such sweeping powers, without setting any standards
for the exercise of them, that it had abdicated its legislative responsibilities and thereby
violated the principle of separation of powers. The Court has not applied these cases or
the reasoning behind them since the 1930's. When the question of delegation of powers
is raised it is customarily disposed of by finding that Congress has provided reasonable
standards for the exercise of the delegated power, thus establishing the policy and goal
for the regulations to be promulgated, and merely delegating the ministerial function
of specific application. But since the standards recognized as reasonable have been so
broad as to be meaningless in determining the scope and content of regulations pro-
mulgated pursuant to them, see K. Davis, supra note 55, at § 2.03, it must be concluded
that the Court has turned its back on the "Hot Oil" and "Sick Chicken" cases. Professor
Davis goes to the length of suggesting that a lawyer does a disservice to his client by
raising the delegation issue. Id. § 2.01, and Professor Corwin believed that "[n]either
of these precedents materially influenced Congressional policy even at the time, and both
have been subsequently relegated by the Court to its increasingly crowded cabinet of
juridical curiosities." E. Corwin, supra note 37, at 127. But Professor Jaffe is not as
certain that the doctrine is dead:
Undoubtedly it can be argued that considered realistically, Schechter has been
put in the museum of constitutional history. But granting the existence of a
doctrine limiting delegation (and almost no court has ever denied it), the
doctrine is intelligible only in terms of the degree of delegation which the
judiciary regards as appropriate in the circumstances. There are still differences
of degree between the NRA on the one hand and the AA and the OPA on the
other. Those examples suggest—and there are others including projected
legislation not passed—that Schechter prods Congress into awareness of its
responsibility for bringing major policy decisions into focus.
L. Jaffe, supra note 55, at 71-72.
To the extent that there is a doctrine limiting the delegation of legislative power,
it would not affect § 5(b) since that section has to do with foreign affairs, in which
great latitude is generally allowed. This was clearly enunciated by the landmark case,
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). The case was an appeal
from an indictment for conspiring to sell arms to Bolivia, in violation of a Joint
Resolution of Congress. The Resolution prohibited the sale of arms to Bolivia and two
countries then at war, and delegated to the President the power to limit the application
of and make exceptions to the Resolution. The Resolution by its terms became effective
only when the President, after consultation with the assurances of cooperation from
other American countries, found that such prohibition would contribute to the re-
establishment of peace and so proclaimed. The President's Proclamation recited that
the consultations had been made, the assurances of cooperation received, and that the
embargo would contribute to the re-establishment of peace. It then delegated to the
Secretary of State the power to prescribe exceptions and limitations to the Resolution.
The Resolution was challenged as an unconstitutional delegation of power to the
President.
The Court began its analysis by assuming that the Resolution would have been
unconstitutional had it related solely to internal affairs (on the assumption that the
doctrines of separation of powers and of nondelegation of legislative power would
govern). But it found a significant difference between the powers of the federal govern-
ment with respect to internal and external affairs. The internal powers were carved out
of legislative powers originally possessed by the states but given to the Congress in the
Constitution. The external powers, however, were composed of various manifestations of
external sovereignty, not possessed by the states prior to the Constitution, and of which
only a few were specifically conferred on Congress or the President in the Constitution.
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of the nation's armed forces. 8° This designation was originally thought
of in purely military terms. Hamilton wrote in The Federalist:
In this respect his authority would be nominally the same as
that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much in-
ferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the su-
preme command and direction of the military and naval
forces, as first general and admiral of the Confederacy:
while that of the British king extends to the declaring of war
and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies."
The commander in chief clause was largely neglected as a source
of presidential power until the weeks following the fall of Fort
Sumter when President Lincoln, without congressional authority,
"summoned troops and paid them out of the Treasury without appro-
As to them the Court found that "if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution
[they] would have vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of
nationality." Id. at 318. The Court found that these external, foreign relations powers
vested in the President rather than in Congress as a result of the nature of their respec-
tive offices. The Court found it was
fdlealing not alone with an authority vested in the President by an exertion
of legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary
and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government
in the field of international relations—a power which does not require as a basis
for its exercise an act of Congress.
Id. at 319-20.
Since many of the external, foreign relations powers are vested in the President, Congress
is unrestricted in delegating to him such external, foreign relations powers as are vested
in it.
The Joint Resolution under consideration in the Curtiss -Wright case was, of course,
far different in nature from § 5(b). It related to a specific event, whereas § 5(b) is
open-ended. It related to a particular type of trade with particular nations, whereas
§ 5(b) relates to any or all trade with any or all nations. It established particular
prohibitions, whereas § 5 (b) leaves it to the President to do so. Nevertheless the rationale
of the Curtiss-Wright case has been uniformly accepted as establishing that Congress has
virtually unlimited discretion in delegating foreign affairs powers to the President,
despite the limited delegation of power under consideration in that case. The second
circuit rested on this reading of the Curtiss-Wright case when the Cuba embargo was
challenged as an exercise of unconstitutionally delegated power in Sardino v. Federal
Reserve Bank, 361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1966).
The claim that the statute constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power is foreclosed by United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co. . . Although
the delegation there sustained was narrower than that in § 5(b) of the Trading
with the Enemy Act, the Court's opinion was not thus circumscribed.
Id. at 110.
86 These include the designation of the President as the commander in chief of the
armed forces, the power, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties,
the power to appoint officers, and the duty to faithfully execute the laws. U.S. Const.
art. II, §§ 2, 3.
87
 The Federalist No. 69, at 417-18 (C. Rossiter ed. 1969) (A. Hamilton).
There is evidence that debate at the Philadelphia convention over the clause and
at sessions of state legislatures held to consider ratification of the Constitution centered
on the advisability of allowing the President to expose himself to the dangers inherent in
physically leading his troops in battle. C. Warren, The Making of the Constitution 530
(1937).
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priation therefor ... proclaimed a naval blockade of the Confederacy
and seized ships violating that blockade." 88 Such actions clearly in-
volved matters normally governed by the powers to call the militia
into service, to make appropriations, to declare war and to regulate
captures on land and sea—powers vested by the Constitution in
Congress.89
Lincoln justified his actions partly on the basis that Congress
was not in session at the time and that the preservation of the Union
required that they be taken. This justification is somewhat belied by
the fact that even after Congress was assembled, Lincoln continued
to use the new-found presidential war powers rather than seek a
delegation of congressional authority or wait for congressional ac-
tion. In addition, the President later instituted a military draft,
proclaimed a national suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and
issued the Emancipation Proclamation, all without congressional
authorization."
Subsequent war Presidents have not relied on their powers as
commander in chief to the same extent because Congress delegated
broad war powers to them in such statutes as the Trading with the
Enemy Act." But in regard to matters not covered by such statutes,
Presidents have continued to take actions within the constitutional
competence of Congress, relying on presidential war powers. Thus,
without any statutory justification, President Wilson created the War
Labor Board to prevent strikes and lockouts from interfering with
the production of goods needed for the war effort during World War
1,92 and President Roosevelt created several agencies to deal with
various aspects of the crisis during World War II. 9a President Roose-
88 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 685 (1952) (Vinson,
C.J., Reed, & Minton, J.J., dissenting).
89 U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8.
99 6 J. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents 96-99, 120 (1911). See
generally C. Rossiter, supra note 79, for a concise account of President Lincoln's extra-
ordinary presidential activities.
91 Statutes of particular importance in this regard include: National Defense Act
of June 3, 1916, ch. 134, 39 Stat. 166; Lever Act (Food Control) of Aug. 10, 1917, ch.
53, 40 Stat. 276; Selective Training and Service Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, 54 Stat,
885; Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941, ch. 11, 55 Stat. 31 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 411-19
(1964)) ; Emergency Price Control Act of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23; and, Second
. War Powers Act of March 27, 1942, ch. 199, 56 Stat. 176 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 355
(1964) ; 49 U.S.C. §§ 304-10a, 911 (1964) ; 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 643-43c, 645-45b, 1152
(1964)).
92 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 693 (1952).
93 Professor Corwin received a statement from the Executive Office of the President
in April of 1942 listing 35 agencies of "purely presidential creation." In creating most
of the agencies the President had invoked his powers as commander in chief and under
the First War Powers Act. But since several of the agencies were created before that
Act and the Act did not authorize the creation of new offices but only a redistribution
of functions, these actions were based primarily on the President's constitutional powers.
E. Corwin, supra note 37, at 242-43.
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velt also seized various industrial plants prior to the Japanese inva-
sion of Pearl Harbor when strikes threatened to disrupt the produc-
tion of needed war materials." No statute authorized such seizures,
but the President justified them by citing his constitutional war
powers."
A relatively recent example of the attempted use of these powers
was President Truman's seizure of the steel industry to prevent a
nation-wide steel strike during the Korean incident." Although the
Court denied him the power to make this seizure in Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer" ("Steel Seizure" case) the consensus of the
04 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S . 579, 621 (1952).
05 89 Cong. Rec. 3992 (1943) (statement by the Attorney General read into the
record by Senator Barkley).
96
 Exec. Order No. 10340, 3 C.F.R. 861 (Comp. 1949- 53).
x 7 343 U.S. 579 (1952). The holding of this case and its value as precedent are
difficult to determine since each of the six justices in the majority wrote a separate
opinion.
The opinion of the Court, written by Justice Black, rested on the proposition that
Congress could have seized the steel mills and insofar as it could have done so, the
President could not do so. To support this proposition Justice Black adduces the
doctrine of separation of powers, citing no precedent or governmental practice. The
dissenting opinion, however, recites a long list of presidential actions, dating back to
Washington's Declaration of Neutrality during the French Revolution taken without
congressional authorization and judicial precedents supporting such actions. Justice
Black's opinion was, as is pointed out by Professor Corwin, earmarked by "hasty im-
provisation as well as . . . [by] strong prepossession, being unquestionably contradicted
by a long record of presidential pioneering in territory eventually occupied by Congress."
E. Corwin, supra note 37, at 155.
The opinions of the other justices constituting the majority generally developed
two lines of reasoning. They regarded the seizure in question as an exercise of the
power of eminent domain, a legislative function, and therefore a power vested by the
Constitution in Congress rather than in the President. Although they generally conceded
that the President had such extraordinary powers in time of emergency and war that he
might, under some circumstances, justfiably affect the seizure in question, they agreed
that such circumstances did not exist. They also looked to Congressional measures
affecting the question: the Taft-Hartley Act for settling labor disputes, which did not
include seizure as an authorized method of resolution, and the Selective Service Act of
1948 and the Defense Production Act of 1956, which did authorize seizure to end labor
disputes. From these and other acts they concluded that Congress had disapproved of
seizure as a method of resolving labor disputes except in certain specified circum-
stances.
The dissenting opinion develops the case for the existence of an emergency power
in the President. It centers on a recitation of presidential actions, dating to Washington's
Proclamation of Neutrality during the French Revolution, taken without congressional
authorization, and on judicial precedents supporting those actions. Besides stressing the
President's powers as commander in chief, it points out that the president had the
constitutional duty to faithfully execute numerous statutes for which the continued
production of steel was necessary. The dis senting justices felt that the existing inter-
national crisis, which was aggravated by the steel stoppage, transcended the situations
which the Taft-Hartley Act was designed to meet and justified the exercise of the Presi-
dent's emergency powers. That the dissent has a certain logic to it is suggested by the
fact that it is the only opinion in which three justices could concur. The inability of the
justices to agree on any one , rationale for deciding the case indicates that the decision
will likely be confined to its facts in the future.
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six separate opinions of the justices in the majority seems not to deny
that the President can take such actions under appropriate circum-
stances, but that Congress had already "occupied the field" with the
Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 and had thereby dictated the procedures
the President was to follow in resolving labor disputes.
The President's war powers, and particularly his designation as
commander in chief, may enable him during wartime to take many
of the actions contemplated in section 5(b) without delegation from
Congress of the power to do so. Regulations typified by the China
embargo and the FD IR certainly could bear as close a relation to, and
be as important to the prosecution of, a war as the actions cited above
of Presidents Lincoln, Wilson, Roosevelt and Truman. The same rea-
sons that justify congressional action pursuant to congressional war
powers during war-related national emergencies, when war appears
imminent and during the aftermath of war, also justify presidential
action pursuant to presidential war powers during such times. In this
regard it should be noted that many of the examples of the President's
use of his war powers cited above occurred in times other than during
a declared war.
It stretches the imagination, however, to assert that the President
may, at any time, issue regulations such as the FDIR in reliance on
his powers as commander in chief. In the absence of imminent war
such measures appear to be concerned solely with international trade
and the national economy. The Constitution does not vest any powers
with regard to foreign commerce or currency in the President. These
are given solely to Congress, and Congress' control over them is con-
sidered plenary." It would follow, therefore, that except as the Pres-
ident could justify his actions by his war powers, he could justify
issuing regulations of the type contemplated in section 5(b) only by a
congressional delegation of authority to him. In this regard it was
held in United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc." that insofar as foreign
commerce is concerned:
98 Trustees of Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933). The foreign
commerce power would easily encompass the types of regulations envisaged by § 5(b).
The power comprehends "every species of commercial intercourse between the United
States and foreign nations. No sort of trade can be carried on between this country and
any other, to which this power does not extend. It has been truly said, that commerce,
as the word is used in the constitution, is a unit, every part of which is indicated by
the term." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 193-94 (1824).
09 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953). This case arose under an executive agreement with
Canada requiring that all contracts to export potatoes from Canada to the United States
contain provisions that such potatoes would be used for seed rather than table purposes
in the United States. This agreement was reached in conjunction with the Agricultural
Act of July 3, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-897, 62 Stat. 1248, under which the government
committed itself to purchase all domestically produced table potatoes that could not be
sold at parity price for such price. The government sought damages for the breach
of such a provision in an export contract. The court could have decided the case on the
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While the President has certain inherent powers under the
Constitution such as the power pertaining to his position as
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy and the power
necessary to see that the laws are faithfully executed, the
power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce is not
among the powers incident to the Presidential office, but is ex-
pressly vested by the Constitution in Congress!'
This reasoning draws considerable support from early judicial
attitudes toward the regulation of foreign commerce. During the
French and English conflicts of the early nineteenth century, 101
 courts
faced the question whether the President could implement an embargo
in the absence of congressional delegation of the authority to do so.
To provide an incentive for recognition of America's rights as a neu-
tral during those conflicts, Congress enacted an embargo against both
belligerents but provided that the President could suspend its opera-
tion against either country if and when he had reason to believe that
that country would observe American rights."' At one point the
British Ambassador to the United States purported to arrange for
British recognition of American neutral rights and President Madison
suspended the embargo against England by proclamation on April 19,
1809. The British government, however, disavowed the arrangements.
President Madison therefore revived the embargo against England by
proclamation on August 19, 1809, although the embargo statute did
more narrow ground of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 519, since
Congress had clearly set out in the Act a procedure for dealing with the problem of
imports other than the one the President adopted. The Act provided that if imports
interfered with the program the President could direct the Tariff Commission to hold
public hearings and could, based on the findings of the Commission, prohibit within
certain percentage limits such interfering imports by proclamation.
100 204 F.2d at 659.
lot At this time both contending European powers so violated the right of neutral
shippers, i.e., of American merchantmen, that America was at times on the brink of
war with each. Violations included the impressment of American seamen into the
English navy and the seizure of American ships and cargos bound to the other power.
Indignation over impressment reached its climax in 1807 when the British warship
H.M.S. Leopard attacked and boarded the U.S.S. Chesapeake and seized three crewmen.
With Congress on the point of declaring war against England after this incident,
President Jefferson decided that economic retaliation would be more appropriate and
effective than military action and asked instead for an embargo against both England and
France. Although the embargo was an economic disaster for the maritime regions of
the country and politically disastrous for Jefferson's followers in those regions, it was
periodically renewed until the underlying European conflict was resolved and outrages
to American merchantmen consequently ceased. See L. Sears, Jefferson and the Embargo
(1966) ; E. Atwater, American Regulation of Arms Export (1941).
102 Act of Jan. 9, 1809, ch. 5, 2 Stat. 506. A series of embargo acts, listed below,
beginning in 1806 succeeded one another with evolution to this act. Act of Apr. 18, 1806,
ch. 29, 2 Stat. 379; Act of Dec. 22, 1807, ch. 5, 2 Stat. 451; Act of Jan. 9, 1808, ch. 8,
2 Stat. 453; Act of Apr. 25, 1808, ch. 66, 2 Stat. 499; Act of Mar. 12, 1808, ch. 33, 2 Stat.
473.
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not provide a revival procedure. In a case arising from seizures pur-
suant to this reimposed embargo, Justice Story held in The Orono
that the President had no inherent power to regulate foreign commerce
by reviving the embargo, and that the statute had conferred no such
power on him.'° 3
The inference in The Orono that Congress could delegate power
to the President to regulate foreign commerce was verified by the
Court in The Brig Aurora.'" This case involved a challenged seizure
under a later embargo act which provided that an embargo against
either England or France would arise only when the President deter-
mined that the other belligerent had ceased to violate neutral rights.
President Madison determined and proclaimed on November 2, 1810,
that France had ceased to violate neutral rights whereas England had
not, thus raising the embargo against England. English cargo from
the Aurora was seized pursuant to the embargo so created. The Court
held that when Congress has the power to enact a measure such as
an embargo, it has the concomitant power to make the effectiveness of
that measure contingent on the occurrence of a certain event, includ-
ing a proclamation by the President. It appears from these two cases
that early judges believed that the President could not regulate for-
eign commerce in his own right, but that Congress could do so through
any vehicle it chose, including a presidential proclamation. Although
this inference lends some support to the theory of the Capps opinion,
several trends in constitutional interpretation and analysis since 1813
render that opinion doubtful, especially as it might be precedent for
actions of the kind taken under section 5(b).
The possibility of presidential actions that may usurp Congress'
power to, regulate foreign commerce in time of war or war-related
national emergency has already been discussed, but congressional
power to regulate foreign commerce in peace time also may be affected
by the President's foreign relations powers. These powers derive
from the Constitution and include the President's powers to make
treaties, appoint ambassadors and receive foreign ambassadors.'° 5
The President's special role in foreign affairs was recognized very
early in the country's history. In an argument on the floor of the
House of Representatives in 1800 John Marshall said, "the Pres-
ident is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its
sole representative with foreign nations."'"
tos The Orono, 18 F. Cas. 830 (No. 10,585) (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) ; see also
President's Proclamation Declared Illegal, 19 F. Cas. 1289 (No. 11,391) (C.C.D.N.C.
1812).
104 The
 Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813). This case
has become the basis for holding that contingency legislation is constitutionally justified.
105 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.
106 10 Annals of Cong. 613 (1800).
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Although this theory had its passionate adherents at the time,'
and approximates reality today, it did not accurately reflect the dis-
tribution of powers made at the Philadelphia Convention. While the
President is given the power to make treaties and appoint ambas-
sadors, he can exercise that power only with the consent of the Sen-
ate.'" Although he can shape foreign policy, he can implement it only
with appropriations from Congress.'" And Congress is vested with
the powers to regulate foreign commerce, lay duties, establish rules
of naturalization, define offenses against the Law of Nations and
with the ultimate power in respect to relations with foreign coun-
tries—the power to declare war."' In making this distribution of
powers, the founding fathers departed markedly from the political
philosophers they followed in other respects, Locke and Montesquieu,
who 'placed the direction of foreign relations solely in the executive
branch."
In practice the direction of foreign affairs has tended to shift be-
tween the executive and legislative branches at particular times, but
the executive has become progressively more dominant, so that today
the President does assume supreme powers in the sphere of foreign
relations. He has successfully by-passed many of the foreign relations
powers vested by the Constitution in Congress. Where the Senate
must confirm ambassadorial appointments, the President may send
his personal emissaries on diplomatic missions without Senate ap-
proval. 112 Where the Senate must confirm treaties, the President may
enter an executive agreement without Senate approval and achieve
the same result as with a treaty." Where Congress must declare war,
107 For an account of the sharp debate between Hamilton, a proponent of this view,
and Madison, an opponent of this view, see E. Corwin, supra note 37, at 177-84.
108 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.
109 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
110
 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
111 J. Locke, Two Treatises on Civil Government §§ 145-46, 148 (1690); C.
Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws ch. 6 (1748).
112 Thus, in 1791 President Washington deputized Gouverneur Morris to confer
with the British government regarding the Treaty of Paris. Perhaps the most famous
presidential emissary was Colonel House, President Wilson's man in Europe. President
Nixon's recent dispatch of Governor Rockefeller to Latin America confirms that the
practice is still very much alive.
113 The Senate's roll in advising the President on treaties foundered in the first
instance. When President Washington attempted to consult in person with the Senate
regarding the terms of a proposed treaty with southern Indians, the Senate spent
its energy debating the procedural manner in which it would advise the President,
rather than debating the substance of the treaty. It finally referred the matter to a
committee and told the President to return another day. E. Corwin, supra note 7, at
209-10. The advice and consent of the Senate proved so cumbersome in instances where
time was of the essence, or in matters involving great technicality, that Presidents
soon began to define American relations with foreign nations by executive agreements
rather than by treaties, for executive agreements have the great advantage of neces-
sitating no action by the Senate. But they are subject to abuse, enabling Presidents
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the President may achieve the same result without Senate approval
simply by sending troops into combat using his powers as com-
mander in chief."4
 Although alarm is frequently expressed over the
President's increasing disregard of Congress in formulating foreign
policy, it is sometimes difficult to determine whether this alarm
merely expresses basic disagreement with the President's policies
rather than with his disregard of the constitutional distribution of
powers. 115
The President's special competence in foreign relations is well
recognized by the judiciary. In the landmark case of United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,' the Court found that the President
has "very delicate, plenary and exclusive power . . . as the sole organ
of the federal government in the field of international relations—a
power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of
Congress . . ." 117
 The Court believed this to be an appropriate allo-
cation of power, for the President
not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the con-
ditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is
this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of
information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, con-
sular and other officials. Secrecy in respect of information
gathered by them may be highly necessary, and the prema-
ture disclosure of its productive or harmful results." 5
to do what has been expressly denied them the power to do. Theodore Roosevelt, for
instance, entered into an executive agreement with bankrupt Santo Domingo to run
that nation's customs system with American personnel to prevent its European creditors
from seizing the system after the Senate had failed to consent to a treaty to the same
effect. Id. at 212. And the Supreme Court has held that despite their possible abuses,
executive agreements are nevertheless the law of the land, as are treaties. United States
v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
114 Presidential actions in sending combat troops to Vietnam, Thailand, the
Dominican Republic and Korea in recent years are just the latest in a long series of
such actions. The power of a President to involve the nation in what can real-
istically only be called a war has not gone completely unquestioned. See Holmes v.
United States, 391 U.S. 936 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ; Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 642 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). A court has
nevertheless sanctioned the executive's use of force abroad without the prior consent
of Congress. Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111 (No. 4,186) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860).
115
 Thus, Senator Fulbright's well-known attempts to reassert the power of the
Senate over the direction of foreign ,policy are . an interesting volte-face from his
earlier view that the President's ability to pursue an effective and coherent foreign
policy was hamstrung by the fragmentation of foreign policy powers among a variety
of Congressional committees. See Eulbright, American Foreign Policy in the 20th Cen-
tury under an 18th Century Constitution, 47 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1961). This transition
may reflect the Senator's growing disenchantment with our involvement in Vietnam.
115 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
117 Id. at 320.
118 Id. See also Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S.
103, 111 (1948).
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In addition to the President's superior access to information and the
frequent necessity to keep such information secret, as The Federalist
papers point out, he is also better suited to conduct the nation's foreign
affairs than Congress because he may speak with one voice rather than
many, and because he is capable of continuous action rather than being
in frequent adjournment.")
But in taking an action pursuant to his foreign relations powers the
President does not thereby preclude Congress from the exercise of its
constitutional powers. Congress may use these powers to limit a
President's choices in formulating foreign policy. No President, for
instance, can formulate an expansive foreign aid program if Congress
will not appropriate funds for foreign aid.'" And if any message
emerges from the "Steel Seizure" case, it is that once Congress has ex-
pressed its will in regard to a matter within its constitutional grant of
power, its determination will be binding on the President. As Justice
Jackson stated in his concurring opinion:
When the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its
lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitu-
tional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress
over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential
control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from
acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once
so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution,
for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our con-
stitutional system. 121
This reasoning applies equally well whether the President is act-
ing pursuant to his war powers or his foreign relations powers. As a
practical matter, however, courts will defer considering the constitu-
tional validity of presidential actions taken during war, and pur-
portedly pursuant to the President's war powers, until the war crisis
is passed. 122 Courts will not necessarily accord such deference to ac-
tions taken pursuant to the President's foreign relations powers.
119 The Federalist, supra note 87, Nos. 69 and 75. Of course this is not unlike the
justification for the delegation of legislative power to the executive generally. See L.
Jaffe, supra note 55, at 33-40.
129 See Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246, U.S. 297, 302 (1918), where the Court
stated: "[T]he conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the
Constitution to the Executive and Legislative Departments . . . of the Govern-
ment." See also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 183 (2d Cir. 1967),
in which the constitutionality of the Hickenlooper Amendment was upheld despite its
interference with the President's "delicate, plenary and exclusive" power over foreign
relations.
121 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952).
122 See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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From this analysis it appears that the President and Congress
have "concurrent powers" over the substantive matters on which regu-
lations are contemplated under section 5(b). The President's claims
to such powers are stronger during war or war-related emergencies
than during peace. Thus, in time of war the President probably has
the power under the war clauses to issue many regulations of the sort
contemplated by section 5 (b), including the FDIR, even without a
specific delegation of power from Congress. If his power to do so is
not clearly established courts nevertheless are unlikely to question
the authority of the President while the crisis in response to which
he has acted still exists. In time of national emergency the President
has similar power, and although it may be more restricted than in time
of war, the extent of the restriction is unclear and may even be in-
significant in the "cold war" context.
On the other hand, it is clear that the Constitution vests primary
responsibility for effecting measures of the type contemplated in
section 5(b), including the FDIR, in Congress rather than in the
President. As a consequence, the President may be precluded from
taking many such measures in time of peace without congressional
authorization. Insofar as those measures affect foreign relations and
have not been dealt with by prior congressional action, however, the
President may have authority to act in regard to them pursuant to his
foreign relations power, even in time of peace. The measures con-
templated in section 5 (b) and contained in the FDIR are, therefore,
within the area of the concurrent powers of Congress and the President
in time of war and, to a lesser extent, in time of peace. But since they
are primarily within the constitutional grant of power to Congress,
Congress' will should prevail over the President's in case of a con-
frontation between the two.
Since most of these measures are necessarily of a fluid and highly
complex nature requiring quick responses to changing conditions and
technical evaluations of existing conditions, they are of the type which
must be exercised by the executive, whether by the President's own
initiative or pursuant to a delegation of authority by Congress. On the
other hand, since they have a potentially pervasive effect on the nation's
entire economy and on the rights and privileges of its citizenry, under
traditional democratic philosophy, the legislative branch of government
should exercise ultimate control over their dimension and contour.
Congress has clearly taken the first step in this direction by delegating
the section 5 (b) powers to the President. Regardless of the uncertainty
as to the limitations of the President's power under section 5 (b), it is
clear from the existence of section 5 (b) that he exercises that power
under a mandate from, and as an agent of, Congress. Congress has
provided guidelines for the exercise of that power only by inference,
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and any attempt to establish guidelines for, or to revoke the delegation
of power in, section 5(b) can be accomplished only over the presiden-
tial veto. While it is unlikely that such a veto is politically possible
in normal times, it is quite likely that it could be politically justified
in times of crisis.
CONCLUSION
In order to retain control over the power vested in it by the
Constitution and to remove the temptation of potentially dictatorial
power from the President, Congress should act to restrict the exercise
of power delegated in section 5(b) and of similar emergency powers
delegated to the President. Such action could take the form of legisla-
tion which would: (1) require that the President activate delegated
emergency powers by declaring national emergencies only under es-
tablished criteria; (2) require that regulations be promulgated pur-
suant to particular emergencies and be responsive to the conditions
leading to the declarations of those emergencies; (3) provide for the
automatic termination of declared emergencies and regulations promul-
gated pursuant to them after a stated period of time unless they are
redeclared and repromulgated pursuant to the same criteria; (4)
charge the courts with the responsibility of reviewing the declarations
and redeclarations of emergencies and the promulgations and repromul-
gations of regulations pursuant to those emergencies to assure that they
conform to the established criteria; and (5) provide that Congress, by
joint resolution, may terminate any delegated emergency power as
well as any emergency declared pursuant to such power and regulation
promulgated pursuant to such emergency. Congressional action to
tighten its control over the delegation of emergency powers in section
5 (b) should evidence a congressional "occupation of the field" and
preclude, at least during peacetime, presidential action except as
authorized and directed by Congress.
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